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Michelman: Legitimation by Constitution (and the News from South Africa)

Symposium, The Civil Rights of
Public School Students
2009 Edward A. Seegers Lecture
LEGITIMATION BY CONSTITUTION
(AND THE NEWS FROM SOUTH AFRICA)
Frank I. Michelman*
Where frequent, obdurate, reasonable disagreement over the wisdom and the
justice of statutes and government decrees is an accepted fact of political life,
justification for the force of law may come to rest on the idea that the laws and
decrees, however sharply and reasonably contested, gain a kind of immunity
against justified complaint from the fact of their having issued in compliance
with the terms of a good, right, or accepted constitution. My lecture will draw
from recent events and debates in South Africa, in a consideration of possible
limits (or objections) to such a constitution-based principle of political
justification.1
How do we justify the force of law to people at large, in countries
where populations often find themselves divided over whether the law
is truly right and as it ought to be? As you can see from my little blurb
for this talk, reproduced above, my title “Legitimation by Constitution”
refers to a certain line of thought that often crops up in both academic
and lay discussions of this question. My blurb calls this a “constitutionbased principle” of legal justification, and it says that my lecture will
submit this idea to testing by recent events and debates in South Africa.
That promise will be kept. Before I finish, I will be suggesting how
current happenings in South Africa suggest certain limiting conditions
on the prospects for legitimation by constitution. By way of illustration,

*
Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University. Thanks to the Edward A.
Seegers Lecture Series, and to the Dean, Faculty, and students of the Valparaiso University
School of Law, for the opportunity to share these thoughts and for gracious hospitality.
1
Reprinted just above is my advance billing for the Edward A. Seegers Lecture,
delivered on November 13, 2009, at Valparaiso University School of Law. I offer the
Lecture text as given, expanded slightly in a few places. I have added footnotes only for
purposes of attributing quoted material and exemplifying current South African
controversies—and in a few spots, to indicate where fuller discussion of some themes and
ideas may be found.

1015

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 4 [2010], Art. 1

1016 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

I will spend some time reflecting on the status and treatment, in South
African constitutionalism’s New Deal, of African indigenous law.
Doing so should fit the occasion, because the question of respect for
indigenous law—or what is often called “customary” law—is very much
a question of civil rights.2 To those South Africans whose lives are
wrapped up with traditional ways of living, South Africa’s Constitution
guarantees important civil rights of cultural association and selfdetermination. At the same time, the Constitution guarantees to
everyone in the country civil rights of equality and freedom from
discrimination. One might think, especially here, of the fraction of
“everyone” who are women,3 but of course men, too, have direct stakes
(I mean, apart from the stakes that all citizens hold in matters of basic
justice) in the question of the civil rights of members of traditional
communities.4
South African officials, judges included, face the
challenge of discovering, constructing, or inducing a potential for
compatibility between respect for traditional forms and practices of life
and law and civic equality regardless of sex or gender. Recent work of
the South African Constitutional Court is interestingly suggestive along
these lines, and I will examine it.
First, though, I need to take some time unpacking the idea of
legitimation by constitution, so that we will be able, by the end, to see
how South Africa’s indigenous-law question relates to it. Systems of
legal ordering always invite a question of justification or legitimacy.5 We
want to understand how to justify the demands we make on each other
in the name of the law. Demands, I mean, that we back with threats of
force; demands we make for everyone’s regular compliance with the
laws of the country, and of course that includes compliance by those
2
The Lecture was scheduled as a curtain-raiser for a day-long conference on “Civil
Rights in the Obama Era.”
3
For an introduction to the apparent tensions in South Africa between claims to civil
equality and to respect for indigenous law, and for citations to major South African
sources, see generally Penelope E. Andrews, Who’s Afraid of Polygamy? Exploring the
Boundaries of Family, Equality and Custom in South Africa, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 351.
4
Consider, for example, current controversy over the constitutional and other
appropriate limits, if any, on oversight by state health and police authorities of the conduct
of ritual circumcision by traditional leaders and communities. See, e.g., Chiefs at Odds With
Youth Over Circumcision, THE HERALD ONLINE, Nov. 10, 2009, http://www.theherald.co.
za/article.aspx?id=496080; Judgment in Forced Circumcision Case, LEGALBRIEF TODAY, Oct.
14, 2009, http://www.legalbrief.co.za/article.php?story=20091014084902414 (last visited
Mar. 24, 2010).
5
For a fuller presentation of the idea of legitimation by constitution, and its association
with a branch of contemporary liberal political philosophy, see Frank I. Michelman,
Constitutional Legitimation for Political Acts, 66 MOD. L. REV. 1 (2003). A full set of citations
to my writings on this topic can be found in Frank I. Michelman, Reply to Ming-Sung Kuo, 7
I-CON 715, 715 n.1 (2009).
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who might not like or approve of all the laws that get made. One answer
to this sort of question, which has apparently proved appealing in many
contemporary societies, is that demands for legal compliance are
justified as long as the laws in question issue from a general system for
lawmaking and legal administration—a constitutional regime—that
everyone can fairly be called on to accept.
On this view, justification for the force of a law depends on whether
that law issued from what we may call a “legitimation-worthy”
constitution. To call a constitution legitimation-worthy, in this sense, is
to say that its prescriptions, including both its procedural provisions for
democratic government and its substantive requirements of respect for
basic rights, have a special kind of merit. Namely, they cast a mantle of
moral probity over enforcement against everyone of approximately all of
the laws that come properly out of the system they constitute. A
legitimation-worthy constitution is one whose terms are such as to allow
you or me to say, with clear conscience, that any law whose process of
enactment, and whose content, pass muster under that constitution’s
requirements can ipso facto be deemed a law that all within range have
good enough reason to accept, even if they disagree with it. Such a
proposition, if accepted, diverts the burden of justification from the
particular law in question to the legally constituted political system that
produced it.
“Well, but how is that supposed to help?” you might ask. In
societies as culturally and otherwise diverse as the ones we are talking
about, mustn’t we expect disagreement over what should have gone into
the constitution, no less than disagreement about the merits of one or
another piece of current legislation? In response, theorists may suggest
reasons why that need not be so. For one thing, they may say,
constitutions are primarily about procedures for lawmaking and other
aspects of governance, not the substantive contents of laws, and people
who have trouble agreeing about the substantive merits of specific laws
may find it a lot easier to agree on what qualifies as a fair process for
democratic governance and public decision-making. Additionally, when
constitutions do talk about people’s substantive rights, they usually do
so at a pretty high level of abstraction. They speak, for example, of a
right of “equality before the law.” It seems that just about everyone can
agree on a constitutional commitment to equality before the law and
actually feel reassured by that commitment, even if they know they will
not agree on all the relevant, concrete issues of implementation, such as
affirmative action, for example. And so, maybe we all can call upon each
other to accept that a given constitution contains an apt and fair set of
general, framework rules for governance in a diverse population of free
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and equal persons whose various aims, hopes, and projects will often
come into conflict.
Now, try this on for size:
The Republic of South Africa is . . . [a] democratic state
founded on the following values:
(a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the
advancement of human rights and freedoms.
(b) Non-racialism and non-sexism.
(c) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law.
(d) Universal adult suffrage, . . . regular elections and a multiparty system of democratic government . . . .
That comes from the section on founding values of the republic in
South Africa’s current Constitution.6 You can rest assured that the rest
of the document is more or less aptly drafted to carry out the program.
In fact, it has supported constitutional rulings and (where required)
resultant legislation prohibiting the death penalty,7 abolishing the crime
of sodomy,8 upholding affirmative action,9 instituting gay marriage,10
extending social security benefits to non-citizens,11 tightly restricting
residential evictions,12 recasting and expanding AIDS treatment policy,13
and enforcing multi-cultural tolerance in schools,14 among other things
(and the recital could go on and on). The Constitution’s chief expositor,
South Africa’s Constitutional Court, has achieved, over the first fifteen
years of its existence, a remarkable international reputation and
standing, not only as one of the world’s notably skilled, informed, and
adept constitutional tribunals, but as one of those whose work helps to
set terms and standards for constitutional adjudication around the globe.
Sound good?
Today, in South Africa, one picks up rumblings of the possibility of
constitutional failure. I do not mean rumblings only on the right, from
observers who find themselves disturbed and alarmed by rulings of the
S. AFR. CONST. 1996, s 1.
See S. v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.).
8
See Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice, 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) (S.
Afr.).
9
See Minister of Fin. v. Van Heerden, 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC) (S. Afr.).
10
See Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) (S. Afr.).
11
See Khosa v. Minister of Soc. Dev., 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) (S. Afr.).
12
See, e.g., Port Elizabeth Municipality v. Various Occupiers, 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) (S.
Afr.).
13
See, e.g., Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (S.
Afr.).
14
M.E.C. for Educ., KwaZulu-Natal v. Pillay, 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) (S. Afr.).
6
7
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kinds I have mentioned. I also mean rumblings from what can only be
called the left, as I’ll explain soon. Some people are having serious
second thoughts about South Africa’s constitutional “miracle”—as it was
called in those heady years of the nineties when it seemed to the world
that South Africa had, by an amazing feat of constitution-creation,
transformed itself into the southern hemisphere’s model constitutionaldemocratic regime.15 Please do not misunderstand me. I am not here as
a doomsayer. I am not among the rumblers. But the rumbles are there,
and they demand attention from all who strive to understand the puzzle
of legitimation by constitution.
In South Africa, today, one hears intimations of crisis. Thoughtful
observers notice “disturbing signs pointing towards the decline of
constitutionalism,” including worries over whether the governing
authorities may have “failed to internalise the precepts of the
constitutional state.”16 Prominent figures voice doubts about the future
of the rule of law and constitutional government in that country.17
Observers talk of a “spiral of despondency” among jurists, accentuated
by a recent spate of withdrawals by some highly regarded judges from
consideration for appointment to the country’s top courts.18
I cannot here describe, in any detail, the recent events that have
apparently helped to spark and spread these concerns. They have
included controversial prosecutions of high officials;19 also some
resulting very public and ugly brawls, not only among constituted
branches of the state, but among judges and between courts.20 There is
See, e.g., HASSAN IBRAHIM, THE SOUL OF A NATION: CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN SOUTH
AFRICA 3 (1998).
16
Francois Venter, Liberal Democracy: The Unintended Consequence—South African
Constitution-Writing Propelled by the Winds of Globalisation, S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS.
(forthcoming).
17
See Adam Dodek, State v. Zuma: The Future of Constitutional Democracy in South Africa,
3 J. P. POL. L. 121, 128 (2009) (writing of an impending “battle over constitutionalism”); De
Klerk warns of bending Constitution to the will of the ANC, LEGALBRIEF TODAY, Oct. 13, 2009,
available at http://www.legalbrief.co.za/article.php?story=20091013083540332 (last visited
Mar. 24, 2010) (reporting remarks of former President F. W. De Klerk, expressing concern
about partisan-political take-over of the Constitution).
18
See Judges Caught in ‘Spiral of Despondency,’ LEGALBRIEF TODAY, Sept. 18, 2009,
http://www.legalbrief.co.za/article.php?story=20090918085146901 (last visited Mar. 24,
2010); Franny Rabkin, Another Judge Gives Up On JSC Interviews, BUS. DAY, Sept. 17, 2009,
available at http://www.businessday.co.za/Articles/Content.aspx?id=81678 (last visited
Mar. 24, 2010).
19
For an account of events surrounding the prosecution, on charges of corruption, of
Jacob Zuma, see Dodek, supra note 17.
20
For reviews of the most prominent inter-judicial controversy, see Theunis Roux, The
South African Constitutional Court and the Hlophe Controversy, International and
Comparative Perspectives on Constitutional Law, Paper Delivered at Centre for
Comparative Studies 21st Anniversary Celebration, Melbourne, (Nov. 27, 2009); Penelope
15
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also deep controversy over the conduct of the body which acts as the
country’s agency for judicial discipline and for screening judicial
appointments, both in response to those brawls21 and in producing its
most recent slates of nominees for high judicial office.22 Also, South
Africa has witnessed a barrage of disturbingly intemperate, even
physically threatening, outbursts from some social leaders displeased by
court proceedings.23 Legislative initiatives from the government24 and
statements from high-ranking officials,25 are found by some observers to
convey both a contempt for judicial independence and a hostility toward
the judiciary, or at least that part of it that acts as the main, judicial
keeper of the Constitution.
This recent turmoil surely reflects tensions and anxieties that go back
a long way, some of them clearly and sadly divisive along lines of race,
class, and culture.26 There have been tensions over the pace at which,
and the means by which, the higher judiciary and upper ranks of the
legal profession are being repopulated by the formerly-excluded and
subjugated peoples;27 tensions over moves by the government to take
control of judicial administration and training;28 tensions over the role of
the courts in prodding and steering constitutionally-committed social
development and resource redistribution;29 tensions over judge-led

Andrews, The Judiciary in South Africa: Independence or Illusion 30–33 (Working Paper, 2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1279225.
21
See, e.g., Franny Rabkin, Hlophe Decision a ‘Threat to the Rule of Law,’ BUS. DAY, Oct. 15,
2009, available at http://www.businessday.co.za/Articles/Content.aspx?id=84037 (last
visited Mar. 24, 2010) (reporting reactions to the decision of the Judicial Service
Commission not to proceed with a full investigation of charges and counter-charges
between Judge Hlophe and the justices of the Constitutional Court).
22
See, e.g., Editorial, Sitting in Judgment MAIL & GUARDIAN ONLINE, Sept. 25, 2009,
http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-09-25-sitting-in-judgment (last visited Mar. 24, 2010).
23
See Andrews, supra note 20, at 33–34; Dodek, supra note 17, at 133; Malema Doesn’t
Budge on Zuma Remark, MAIL & GUARDIAN ONLINE, June 21, 2008, http://www.mg.co.za/
article/2008-06-21-malema-doesnt-budge-on-zuma-remark (last visited Mar. 24, 2010).
24
See, e.g., Sello Alcock, Tackling Transformation of the Judiciary, MAIL AND GUARDIAN
ONLINE, June 12, 2009, http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-06-12-tackling-transformation
-of-the-judiciary (last visited Mar. 24, 2010).
25
See Moshoeshoe Monare, Zuma Takes Aim at Top Judges, THE STAR, Apr. 9, 2009,
available at http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=6&art_id=vn200904090
50224266C609125 (last visited Mar. 24, 2010).
26
See Andrews, supra note 20, at 34–35.
27
See id.; Prakash Naidoo, The Judiciary: Trying Times, FINANCIAL MAIL, Oct. 23, 2009,
http://secure.financialmail.co.za/09/1023/cover/coverstory.htm (last visited Mar. 24,
2010).
28
See Andrews, supra note 20, at 28–30; Venter, supra note 16.
29
See, e.g., Bernard Ngoepe, Choosing New Custodians of Our Constitution, TIMES LIVE,
Aug. 30, 2009, available at http://www.timeslive.co.za/sundaytimes/article34943.ece (last
visited Mar. 24, 2010) (Bernard Ngoepe is a South African high court judge-president).
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intrusions, in the name of the Constitution and its progressive-liberal
values, into entrenched, customary forms of social life;30 and so on.
As I tick off that list of sore points, you might think that those don’t
seem to go beyond the stresses that would necessarily have to attend any
process of conversion of the old, absolutist, apartheid state into a new,
egalitarian, constitutional-democratic society. Sure, South Africa is
enduring the obduracy of poverty, of deprivation, of crime. The pace of
promised redistributions of access can seem slow; it is slow. The country
suffers from the persistence of suspicion and mistrust across racial and
cultural divides, and doubtless that is aggravated by the country’s
failure, so far, to transcend one-party government and achieve the multiparty, democratic contestation promised by the Constitution.31 And
sure, these conditions are bound to generate a certain amount of
resentment, anxiety, and bad temper. But what they signal are failures
and shortfalls of public administration and of societal mobilization, not a
crisis of law or of the Constitution.
Something like that would be the view of many, maybe most,
informed South Africans,32 and I harbor no conviction to the contrary.
One does, however, notice the presence in the conversation of trends of
thought more radically inclined, toward asking whether current rifts
might possibly stem from deep faults of the Constitution. The faults
suggested pertain both to constitutional substance and to the processes
by which the constitution was created and brought into force.33 On the
side of substance, one finds charges of failures of justice and failures of
fitness. The Constitution simply fails, some say—and fails largely by
reason of its westernized constructions of human rights—to carry out the
See, e.g., id.; supra note 4.
See S. AFR. CONST. 1996, s 1(d) (including, among the founding values of the Republic,
a commitment to “a multi-party system of democratic government, to ensure
accountability, responsiveness and openness”).
32
See, e.g., Dispute Hasn’t Placed Judiciary in Crisis, DAILY DISPATCH ONLINE, Sept. 23,
2009, http://www.dispatch.co.za/article.aspx?id=347040 (last visited Mar. 24, 2010)
(reporting remarks of Johan Froneman, a widely respected judge, since then appointed to
the Constitutional Court).
33
For a crisp summary of recent colloquy concerning alleged faults in the Constitution,
its origins, and its administration, see Kenneth Walker, At the Heart of South Africa: A
Constitution and a Court, 4 CARNEGIE REP. no. 2 (Spring 2007), available at
http://www.carnegie.org/reporter/14/constitution/index.html.
Recent, thoughtful
essays by law professors Francois Venter and Henk Botha start out by asking whether an
“apparent deterioration in South African constitutionalism” should be “ascribed to the
manner in which the Constitution was written” (Venter), or whether “the roots of the
current malaise” are to be found in “the constitution-making process itself” (Botha). Venter,
supra note 16; Henk Botha, Instituting Public Freedom or Extinguishing Constituent Power?
Reflections on South Africa’s Constitution-Making Experiment Paper delivered at the
International Workshop on Constitution-Making, University of Glasgow, May 27−28, 2009.
30
31

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 4 [2010], Art. 1

1022 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

first, most necessary task of restorative justice, which is re-vesting full
possession of the country, and unhindered sovereignty over it, in the
peoples whose land and living space it once was, prior to a long series of
unjust colonial and imperial acts of dispossession.34
One aspect of this injustice, the argument continues, is the
Constitution’s move to take its stand on liberal rights that clash with
deep-seated, identity-fixing cultural contexts and, more generally, to
enact for the country a westernized, individual-centered idealization of
social relations that is alien to the more communalistic disposition,
characteristically African, that runs deep in the practices, customs,
minds, and feelings of the bulk of the population.35 A constitutional
project lacking in justness and fitness is doomed from the start, some
critics may be taken to suggest. Others, not in contradiction of the first
group, place more emphasis on faults they perceive in the Constitution’s
processes of origination, which some see as having been externally
pressured, tactical, elite-dominated, legalistic and juridified, only
shallowly populist and participatory, and insufficiently so to ground the
sort of popular buy-in from Day One that these critics suggest may be
essential for prospects of long-term constitutional legitimacy.36
Questions of this kind, about the justice and fitness for all the people
of South Africa of the Constitution and its birthing, enter a rich and
important set of debates in constitutional theory and political analysis.37
We cannot really pursue those themes in earnest today, however.
Instead, the focus now must shift to the view of critics who, finding no
fault with the Constitution that the country so triumphantly embraced in
1994, trace the current malaise to alleged misreadings and
misapplications of the people’s constitutional program by officials and
by judges, very much including the Constitutional Court.

See M.B. Ramose, In Memoriam; Sovereignty and the “New” South Africa, 16 GRIFFITH L.
REV. 310 (2007); Mogobe B. Ramose, An African Perspective on Justice and Race, POLYLOG
themes 3 (2001), http://them.polylog.org/3/frm-en.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2010).
35
See, e.g., Ramose, In Memoriam; Sovereignty and the “New” South Africa, supra note 34;
Ramose, An African Perspective on Justice and Race, supra note 34; Jean Comaroff & John
Comaroff, The Struggle Between the Constitution and “Things African,” WISER REV., No. 1, p. 6
(July, 2004), available at http://wiserweb.wits.ac.za/PDF%20Files/review-no1.pdf (last
visited Mar. 24, 2010).
36
Concerns of this kind are taken up for examination by Venter, supra note 16, and
Botha, supra note 33.
37
Some of the fruits, including essays cited above by Venter and Botha, are collected in
CONSTITUTIONAL LEARNING: ESSAYS TOWARDS A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF CONSTITUTIONMAKING AND CONSTITUTIONALISATION AS LEARNING PROCESSES (provisional title) (Johan
Van der Walt ed., forthcoming). A leading precursor is JAMES TULLY, STRANGE
MULTIPLICITY: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN AGE OF DIVERSITY (1995).
34
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In the recent verbal hostilities, the Constitutional Court has certainly
taken its share of flak. The Court receives complaint for excessive
intrusion into governmental operations38 (and also, I might add, for the
opposite fault of excessive reticence39); for failure to institute effective
dialogue between itself and the citizenry; for constitutionalizing an
extremity of liberal permissiveness (as the critics see it) in the areas, for
example, of crime control and of sex that the critics apparently doubt the
Constitution truly calls for;40 and for a want of urgency about the vital
necessity of integrating indigenous African values into the development
of South African constitutional law.41
I report the circulation of such views; I do not endorse them. That
the Constitutional Court should have come in for some degree of such
complaint was inevitable. As is necessarily true when constitutions are
drafted in conditions of sharply opposing social stakes and opinions, the
drafting of this one had to make use of some highly visible
postponements in order to keep the main constitutional negotiation from
going off the rails. By “postponements,” I mean decisions by the drafters
to leave certain divisive issues to be dealt with in the future by the
country’s political and judicial authorities. Most famously, the drafters
deliberately ducked the question of the constitutionality of the death
penalty and left it for the Constitutional Court to decide, the so-called
“Solomonic solution.”42 But that is only one among several salient
instances.
The Constitution requires and promises an equitable redistribution
of land and natural resources,43 and it simultaneously guarantees
security of property holdings against uncompensated expropriation.44
The Constitution guarantees everyone’s access to adequate food, water,
health care, and housing,45 and it simultaneously describes the state’s
corresponding obligation in terms of “reasonable . . . measures” to be

See supra note 29.
See, e.g., Jackie Dugard, Court of First Instance? Towards Pro-Poor Jurisdiction for the
South African Constitutional Court, 22 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 262 (2006); Sandra Liebenberg,
Water rights reduced to a trickle, MAIL & GUARDIAN ONLINE, Oct. 21, 2009,
http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-10-21-water-rights-reduced-to-a-trickle (last visited
Mar. 24, 2010).
40
Such complaints appear (for example) in Ngoepe, supra note 29.
41
See, e.g., Hlophe Calls for Africanisation of SA Law, MAIL & GUARDIAN ONLINE, July 10,
2009
http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-07-10-hlophe-calls-for-africanisation-of-sa-law
(last visited Mar. 24, 2010).
42
See S. v. Makwanyane, 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC), ¶¶ 22–25 (S. Afr.).
43
See S. AFR. CONST. 1996, s 25(5).
44
See id. s 25(2)(b), (3).
45
See id. ss 26(1), 27(1).
38
39
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taken “within its available resources.”46 The Constitution guarantees
respect and protection for cultural self-determination47 and for
indigenous law and leadership,48 and it simultaneously guarantees the
protection of every person’s equality before the law and freedom from
unfair
discrimination,
naming
sex-based
discrimination
as
presumptively unfair.49
You might think you see puzzles or contradictions lurking in some
or all of those pairings of constitutional commitments. You might be
right. You can be sure, though, that the contradictions did not result
from blindness on the drafters’ part. Obviously, they reflect the drafters’
recognition of intractable complexity in the issues involved, and a moreor-less desperate decision by them to rely on politicians, lawyers, and
judges, working in context, in good faith and over time, to come up with
pragmatic resolutions that all parties could find decent and acceptable—
if, sometimes, only barely or even bitterly so. No one ever would have
imagined that the Constitutional Court could work its way through these
entanglements without raising sharp complaints from some or another
group of stakeholders.
And, no surprise, the Court has not succeeded in doing that. The
question, though, is whether it has found ways, or bids fair to find ways,
of doing sufficient justice to all sides of these controversies to redeem (if I
may now revert to the opening part of this lecture) the legitimationworthiness of the Constitution entrusted to its care.
And that brings me, then, to the matter of civil rights law that I have
said would provide the core of this talk. I will focus on one case decided
by the Constitutional Court, under the name of Bhe.50 The Bhe case
involves a feature of indigenous law that property lawyers call “male
primogeniture.” It is a feature that comes into play in deciding the
inheritance of property from a person who dies without leaving a will.
Male primogeniture means, first, that only males get to inherit. It also
means that only one person succeeds to all the property—that person
being the eldest male member of the class of survivors closest in blood
relationship to the deceased. Typically, that will be an eldest son, but it
can also be a father, uncle, nephew, or cousin.
Before getting further into the Bhe case, I need to fill you in a bit
more on some relevant constitutional texts. Section 8, the so-called
application clause, stipulates that the Bill of Rights applies to “all law,”
46
47
48
49
50
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which seemingly must include customary law. Section 30, on language
and culture, gives to everyone the right to “participate in the cultural life
of their choice,” but the text immediately goes on to add that no one is
licensed to do so “in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill
of Rights.” Section 31, on cultural communities, gives members of
cultural communities the right to “enjoy their culture;” but, again, the
section immediately goes on to say that this does not grant any
exemption from other provisions in the Bill of Rights. Section 9, the
equality clause of the Bill of Rights, gives everyone a right against
“unfair discrimination,” and it specifically defines discrimination on
grounds of sex or gender to be unfair, by a rebuttable presumption.
One constitutional provision outside of the Bill of Rights has a direct
bearing on the Bhe case. Section 211 guarantees the operation of systems
of customary law under traditional leadership, and it furthermore directs
the state’s regular courts to apply customary law wherever applicable.
Again, however, the text immediately goes on to say that this is to be
done only “subject to the Constitution.”51
Let us now come to the case of Bhe. For the sake of simplicity,
clarity, and speed, I am going to alter the factual and legal background a
little, but not in any way that is material to our discussion. A man to
whom Ms. Bhe was married at the time died without having made a will.
The couple had been living and working in the city of Cape Town with
their two young daughters, in a shack on land to which the husband held
the title. He also owned some personal property, including building
materials for a permanent home. Some or all of these assets had been
acquired through the joint efforts of the deceased and Ms. Bhe. The
magistrate in the case (a state judicial official roughly equivalent, for our
purposes, to a probate judge) awarded the entire estate away from Ms.
Bhe and her daughters, to the decedent’s nearest living male relative,
who happened to be his father. The magistrate thus acted in accordance
with what he took to be the applicable rule of African customary law,
male primogeniture. He did so despite the father’s declared intention of
selling away the land where Ms. Bhe and her daughters had been living,

51
S. AFR. CONST. 1996, s 211(1). To make the survey complete, we should note that the
Constitution establishes a Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of
Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities, to which it assigns important powers and
duties of research, education, mediation, and advocacy. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996, s 185;
Luphert Chilwane, Commission Takes Up Dispute Over Bull Ritual, BUSINESS DAY, Dec. 18,
2009, available at http://www.businessday.co.za/Articles/Content.aspx?id=89843 (last
visited Feb. 9, 2010) (reporting on the Commission’s initiative to achieve mutual
understanding between Animal Rights Africa and the Zulu traditional leadership in regard
to an annual first-fruits ceremony involving the killing of a bull).
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in order to repay himself for the expenses of his son’s funeral, leaving
Ms. Bhe and her girls to live who knows where, or how.
Now, that is not how the estate would have gone under the state’s
general Intestate Succession Act, the standard law that applies to cases of
intestacy outside the customary-law situation. That law provides for sexneutral inheritance; it places spouses and children first in line, ahead of
their in-laws and grandparents; and it divides estates equitably among
the surviving spouse and children. And so you might be asking
yourself: On what fair basis could a magistrate decide that this was a
customary-law situation to be governed by male primogeniture, rather
than one to be governed by the standard law of the state? In general, the
answer would have to be that it was because the couple had entered
their marriage under customary law, or had otherwise been living as a
part of a traditional community. In those conditions, the combined effect
of section 30 (granting people rights to participate in the cultural life of
their choice) and section 211 of the Constitution (providing for the
operation of customary legal systems and directing state judges to apply
customary law where applicable) does, indeed, appear to be that the
magistrate must decide the line of inheritance from Ms. Bhe’s deceased
husband in accordance with customary law.
But, of course Ms. Bhe went to court claiming that the customary
rule at issue in this case, the rule of inheritance by males only, is
unconstitutional. (By direction of section 8, remember, the Bill of Rights
applies to “all law”). As you might expect, given my description of the
relevant constitutional texts, the Constitutional Court agreed with that
proposition. Customary law, the Court said, “is protected by and subject
to the Constitution in its own right”, as “an integral part of our law;” but,
still, customary law must “first and foremost answer[] to the contents of
the Constitution.”52 The Court concluded that “[t]he exclusion of women
from inheritance on the grounds of gender is a clear violation” of the
Constitution’s guarantee, in section 9, against sex-based discrimination.53
The Constitution directs the Court to declare invalid any law that it
finds to be inconsistent with constitutional requirements.54 But the
Court, in this case, could not simply do that and stop. That would have
left a gap in the customary law; there would have been no rule, then, to
govern inheritance in the customary law situation. So what did the
Court do? Using power that the Constitution grants it to craft just and
equitable remedial orders,55 the Court decreed that succession to
52
53
54
55
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property in the customary law situation would be governed by the
state’s regular rules of inheritance,56 unless and until Parliament should
legislate some different solution (which would, of course, itself have to
pass constitutional muster).
Here we reach an important point. The Court had been urged to
adopt a different form of remedy, which arguably would have signified
a greater depth of commitment to the respected status of customary law
and its future place in the lives of the people. The Constitution contains
an important section 39(2) directing courts, when applying common or
customary law, to construe and develop that law in line with “the spirit,
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.”57 Just as American courts are
expected to revise and adjust common law rules in response to changes
in society and in prevailing societal values and understandings, so the
judges in this case might have treated the customary rule of male
primogeniture. Rather than simply discarding the rule as impossibly
sexist and out of step, the Court might have done the customary rule the
honor—so to speak—of treating it as no less worthy than, say, some
outmoded rule in the common law of contract of judicial attention and
care to bring it into line with the evolution in social conditions and
values represented by the Constitution.
Exactly that course was urged by one of the Court’s eleven members.
Interestingly, that single dissenter from the Court’s remedial order was
Justice Sandile Ngcobo, who has just recently become the Chief Justice,
replacing the retired Justice Pius Langa, who wrote for the majority of
ten in the Bhe case. Justice Ngcobo would have had the Court develop
the primogeniture rule, but also preserve it. He would have done this by
simply removing the reference to males.58 That would result, for
example, in having the eldest surviving child, regardless of gender,
succeed to the entire estate, without any allowance for a surviving
spouse or division with other children—a result quite different from
what happens under the state’s standard rules of inheritance.
We will come back soon to Justice Ngcobo’s remedial proposal.
Before we do, we must take note that, as a matter of fact, the majority’s
opinion in Bhe lays the groundwork for exactly such a proposal. That
groundwork essentially consists of two propositions, which both
opinions, the majority’s and Justice Ngcobo’s, explain with care. First,
the primogeniture rule arose in a state of society and a cultural context in
which it served a benign purpose, but which have largely passed out of

56
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See Bhe, (1) SA 580 at ¶ 136(6).
See S. AFR. CONST. 1996, s 39(2).
See id. at ¶¶ 218–22 (Ngcobo, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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existence.59 Second, in the absence of positive assistance from the state’s
judicial and legislative bodies, the customary law available for
application in the state courts of South Africa is blocked from the normal
path of evolution to keep up with changes in society.60
As the opinions explain, the rule of inheritance by male
primogeniture arose within a strongly communal and familial form of
social life. It was a part of a system containing ample safeguards for
fairness and welfare, based on the cohesion and stability of extended
family groups on which everyone depended for production, sustenance,
and emotional support. Property—of which by far the most important
component was pastoral and agricultural land—was, in substance,
collectively owned. As nominal holder of the title, the extended family
head administered the patrimony for the welfare of the family unit as a
whole; he held the title, so to speak, in trust for the family. When a
family head died, the “heir”—as we call this person today, somewhat
inaptly—stepped into his shoes and assumed all the obligations attached
to the headship role. Dependents of the deceased, or maybe better call
them family constituents, continued as family constituents of the
successor. The successor acquired the duty to ensure the maintenance
and support of all members of the family, and to administer the estate to
that end only. As Justice Ngcobo further explains, there was a real
reason (granting that one could not call it a purely gender-neutral
reason) for preferring males as successors to family headships. Women,
upon marriage, were expected to leave their natal families and join the
families of their husbands, and would not, therefore, be suitably situated
for headship responsibility toward their families of birth.61
Needless to say, and as both opinions emphasize, the world has
changed drastically since then, in ways that the facts of the Bhe case
perfectly typify. In the words of the majority:
Nuclear families have largely replaced traditional
extended families. The heir does not necessarily live
together with the whole extended family which would
include the spouse of the deceased as well as other
dependants and descendants. He often simply acquires

See id. at ¶¶ 75–76, 80, 83–84 (majority opinion); id. at ¶¶ 156–74, 188–90 (Ngcobo, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
60
See id. at ¶¶ 82, 84–90 (majority opinion); id. at ¶¶ 153–55, 175–77 (Ngcobo, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
61
See id. at ¶ 174 (Ngcobo, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
59

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss4/1

Michelman: Legitimation by Constitution (and the News from South Africa)

2010]

Legitimation by Constitution

1029

the estate without assuming, or even being in a position
to assume, any of the deceased’s responsibilities.62
In short, for what is doubtless a majority of that fraction of today’s
South Africans who retain, in many ways, their attachment to traditional
ways and customary legal institutions, the male primogeniture rule is
simply out of whack. It does not work. Originally a part of a scheme for
social solidarity and collective security, it has turned into an engine of
rank unfairness and abuse.
Why, then, has there been no internal evolution of the body of
customary law to reflect these changes? The answer given by both
opinions in the Bhe case is that such development may well have taken
place; but any such development will have occurred indigenously—in
non-formal, off-record ways that fail to make the changes readily visible,
as general rules of law to be applied by outsider, state tribunals such as
the magistrate’s court. The problem is one of deviation of the living law
on the ground from the law frozen in the books. During the nineteenth
century, so-called African customary law was codified in rule form by
colonial treatise writers and legislators, and the result has been to lock in
its tracks what the state’s tribunals have since been able to recognize as
customary law. As the Bhe majority writes, with obviously sincere
sympathy and regret, “[t]he outcome has been formalisation and
fossilisation of a system which by its nature should function in an active
and dynamic manner.”63
We are now in a position to attempt an assessment of the Bhe
majority’s rejection of Justice Ngcobo’s proposal that the Constitutional
Court should develop—and, by doing so, should respect and preserve—
the customary law of inheritance; that is, by recasting primogeniture into
a gender-neutral form. One obvious objection to that, noticed by Justice
Ngcobo himself, is, again, the change in social conditions. In the Bhe
case, for example, awarding the entire estate, outright, to the elder of the
two young sisters would make no sense and do no justice.64 In such a
situation, hardly non-typical, the state’s standard rules for
administration and division of intestate property will do a much better
job.
That, however, does not seem to have been the majority’s primary
reason for declining to make the Constitutional Court the default
developer of the content of customary law. For the majority, that
suggestion seemed to pose an insuperable difficulty of evidence.
62
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Whatever the development was to be, it should reflect what the majority
called “the true content of customary law as it is today.”65 And, given
the indigenous, non-formalized nature of customary legal change, and
the uncertainties and disputes that necessarily must attend such
processes, the majority seemed to doubt its capacity, by the normal
means of judicial evidence-taking, to decide what is now to stand as an
authoritative rendition of the current state of customary law. The
majority was also concerned that an inevitably protracted and piecemeal
process of judicial verification of indigenous legal change would result in
an unacceptable postponement of the urgent, civic claims of women to
nondiscriminatory treatment. Pending any action from Parliament, the
best they could do right away, the majority thought, was to order
application of the state’s standard rules to cases of inheritance in a
customary law situation.66
Not so, said Justice Ngcobo, we can do better. First, we must
gender-neutralize the customary rule of primogeniture. But then,
second, instead of a wholesale throw-over of the traditional form of
inheritance by one person of entire family estates, which may still be just
right for some traditional, rural families and communities, we must leave
it to the parties concerned to decide whether to endorse that form of
inheritance or, instead, to choose division under the state’s standard
rules. And, in case of the parties’ inability to agree, we must direct the
state’s magistrates to decide which form of inheritance should apply in
the case at hand, having regard to what would be fair and equitable in
the circumstances.67 To be sure, said Justice Ngcobo, that would result,
sometimes, in differing treatments for inheritance, depending on
whether the matter falls inside or outside the customary law situation.
But this kind and degree of legal pluralism, he added, is dictated by the
Constitution’s recognition of the rights of communities to live and be
governed by indigenous law. It is, he said, “a recognition of our
diversity, which is an important feature of our constitutional
democracy.”68
In developments subsequent to the Bhe decision—I think especially
of a striking decision called Shilubana69 involving the rules of succession
to customary community leadership—there are clear signs that the
Constitutional Court as a whole really shares the dispositions for which

Id. at ¶ 109 (majority opinion).
See id. at ¶¶ 110–16.
67
See Bhe, (1) SA 580 at ¶¶ 229–34, 236–39 (Ngcobo, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
68
Id. at ¶ 235.
69
Shilubana v. Nwamitwa, 2009 (2) SA 66 (CC) (S. Afr.).
65
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Justice Ngcobo spoke out in Bhe.70 I mean a disposition to heed and to
encourage internal development of the old ways by the communities
themselves, so that they, themselves, work out an understanding of the
tradition’s true reflection of the Constitution’s paradigm of rights; plus a
judicial disposition to conduct serious, evidentiary inquiries, in litigated
cases, into the contemporary content of the living customary law; plus a
disposition to shoulder, when necessary, the judicial responsibility of
directly developing indigenous law to keep it in tune with the
Constitution.71 The Constitutional Court, today, under Justice Ngcobo’s
leadership, might be described as poised to exert itself to the utmost to
give maximum possible space and respect to customary law, within
outer bounds laid down by the Bill of Rights.
Suppose that is truly the case and the rest of the South African state
judiciary, government, and Parliament, will do their best to follow suit.
Where would that leave the concerns I mentioned earlier, about a deep
and de-legitimizing failure of justice and fitness in the Constitution, by
reason of a massive, imposed displacement of African indigenous social
ideals by a Eurocentric-liberal system based on an essentially
contestational, as opposed to solidaristic, form of democratic politics,
and on respect and protection for an individualistic conception of human
dignity, as opposed to the pursuit of collective being?
By posing that question, I mean to redeem my promise to tie up
South Africa’s indigenous law debate with the theoretical proposition of
legitimation by Constitution. The question—crudely put—would be
whether the asserted clash between the African and the European social
and political outlooks is so deep and drastic that one group or the other
is, inevitably, going to experience a profound disaffection for, and

See Gumede (born Shange) v. President of the Republic, 2009 (3) SA 152 (CC) (S. Afr.)
(declaring invalid a statutory codification of a gender-discriminatory, customary-legal
scheme of marital property, while noting both the ”fossilization” of customary law
wrought by the codification and the judicial obligation to develop customary law in
harmony with the Constitution, where not blocked by statute from doing so). See generally
id. at ¶¶ 16, 18, 20–21, 29.
71
All of these dispositions are manifest in Shilubana, (2) SA 66. In that case, unlike in
Bhe, the Constitutional Court did see fit, as prompted by Constitution Section 39(2), to
develop customary law in keeping with the spirit, purport, and objects of the bill of rights.
The Court did not, however, do so in a way that put it into the position of dictating to the
community a gender-neutralizing alteration in the community’s indigenous law of
succession to rulership. Rather, the Court intervened at a secondary level, that of the
community’s rules for accomplishing customary legal change. The Court engineered a
development of the secondary rules so as to remove a procedural blockage, thus enabling
plausibly identified, traditional authorities to put into effect a pending, contested, genderneutralizing revision of the primary succession rule.
70
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disengagement from, this Constitution (and, perhaps, from any
constitution that might have been written for the country).
On a purely speculative level, it seems to me that one could go either
way with this. Assume, first, that the courts and the government can
succeed in conveying a credible, honest commitment to go as far as the
Constitution allows in respecting and nurturing indigenous law and can
do so, in the words of Yvonne Mokgoro, a recently retired South African
justice, “creatively, strategically, and with ingenuity,” with a view to the
rise of “a new indigenous law and jurisprudence” that can meet “the
demands of constitutionalism”72 while also, reciprocally, helping to
shape a new, distinctively “South African constitutional value system.”73
Then, maybe, bearing in mind the obvious advantages to everyone from
stable and decent government in South African territory, the
disappointment, disagreement, and frustration suffered by the losers in
these disputes—whichever side they may be on—need not and will not
deepen and harden into the kind of profound disaffection from the
system that threatens legitimacy.
But what if we assume, instead, that those critics are right who say
that the Constitution’s refusal to submit the country, unconditionally, to
total, political-cultural Africanization (whatever we think that might
mean in practice) is an ultimately non-assimilable failure of both simple
justice to the colonially dispossessed peoples in the area and fitness to
their deeply ingrained visions of society? On that premise, it could seem
that no possible notion of legitimation by constitution—and certainly not
by this Constitution—can work for South Africa.
Whether that would turn out, ultimately, to be good or bad news for
some or all South Africans is a question at the core of some of the debates
that I have, all too sketchily, been trying to describe. In either case,
though, it may not be altogether encouraging news for political theories
of legitimation by constitution. Because, one might ask—and South
Africans may want to ponder seriously—which constitution will be
legitimation-worthy in South Africa, if this one is not?
Of course, we cannot exclude, a priori, that the answer to that
question is “none.” If we find that prospect unwelcome, we might want
to consider whether we do best to think of the Constitution as a one-off
done deal, a sealed and settled contract to be abided by until

72
Yvonne Mokgoro, Ubuntu and the Law in South Africa, Paper delivered at the first
Colloquium Constitution and Law held at Potchefstroomt, South Africa, (Oct. 31, 1997),
available at http://ajol.info/index.php/pelj/article/view/43567/27090 (last visited Mar.
24, 2010).
73
Yvonne Mokgoro, The Customary Law Question in the South African Constitution, 41 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 1279, 1280 (1997).
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overthrown—or, rather, to think of it as a project, a work in progress, the
legitimacy and success of which do now, and will always, rest in the care
and keeping of a society whose constitution it is still (or, rather, might or
might not still be) in a state of becoming.
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